Introduction

It is widely accepted that corruption and informal governance actions in both Russia and Ukraine are systemic and endemic, having a significant impact not only on how government functions, but also on how these societies function as a whole. But just because both countries suffer from corrupt practices, the way in which these practices manifest can differ greatly between them. Even the precise definition of corruption is not universally agreed upon, but most definitions are in agreement that it generally involves public officials using their position power for some kind of personal reward “corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain” (Klitgaard, 1989). Anheier defines informal governance as “governance structures that emerge through non-institutional channel, driven by social relationships and voluntary cooperation” (Anheier, 2014). Although informal governance inevitably involves practices that would be considered corrupt within highly institutionalised and highly regulated systems, where the government is rewarded with election victories not only based on economic performance, but often on the trust based notion that they morally adhered to the rules of the game. It could be argued that informal governance in Russia and Ukraine is simply an evolutionary adaptation to the rules of the game within the confines of their own political culture, given that these systems are in one way or another the successors of the old communist regime, and some practices and attitudes have naturally transferred and embedded themselves into the new systems. Although this essay will not focus on the morality or immorality of informal governance, it is important to understand that all regimes and systems are to some extent culturally bound, and what is considered corruption in one system, may be fair game in another, and that due to their unique cultural boundedness, even two regimes of informal governance that emerged from the embers of the same predecessor, can develop their own unique traits. This essay will examine the flaws and sometimes benefits of the informal systems of Russia and Ukraine whilst comparing the two to highlight the differences and possible similarities. It will do this by looking how these informal networks manifest in each respective country in areas of governance, namely, when dealing with sanctions, their individual energy sectors, and finally implementation of defence plans and spending.